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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRED WALKER, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
C. C. BINTZ, and SHAW, INC., a 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Appellants. 
Case No. 
8224 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the statement, the appellant, C. C. Bintz will be 
designated as "Bintz," the appellant Shaw, Inc. as "Shaw" 
and the respondent, Fred Walker, as "Walker." Emphasis 
has been supplied. 
This case involves the construction of the instrument 
commonly used in the State of Utah in connection with real 
estate transactions, designated as an "Earnest Money Re-
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ceipt and Offer to Purchase" and herein referred to as 
"Earnest Money Receipt." 
In 1951 Bintz contemplated the purchase of a parcel 
of land in Salt Lake County, Utah. He engaged his coun-
sel, a capable lawyer of wide experience, to examine the 
abstract. Counsel as a result of such examination and the 
examination of certain probate records and a survey which 
showed the exterior boundaries of the premises, approved 
the title for purchase (R. 84-94). 
Bintz bought the property and took title thereto. In 
1953 he decided to sell. He listed the property with Shaw 
who is a real estate broker. Shaw found Walker as a pur-
chaser who on May 11, 1953, signed the Earnest Money 
Receipt (R. 86). Bintz on the next day accepted the terms 
thereof. The sale price was $30,250.00, payable $1,000.00 
down, $4,000.00 on delivery of final contract of sale which 
was to be on July 11, 1953, and $500.00 or more each 
month commencing August 11, 1953, balance to be paid in 
full on or before July 11, 1956, with interest on deferred 
principal at the rate of 5% per annum. The Earnest Money 
Receipt (Exhibit 1) contains the following further pro-
visions: 
"We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions specified above, and the 
Seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title 
with abstract to date or at Seller's option a policy 
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser and 
to make final conveyance by warranty deed." 
Walker paid Shaw the down payment of $1,000.00. 
Bintz submitted his abstract of title. Walker's counsel ex· 
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amined the same and noted certain title exceptions. Bintz 
having purchased the property as a result of the examina-
tion of his counsel regarded his title as good. However, he 
did not stand on the opinion of his counsel, but authorized 
Shaw to take any steps within reason to satisfy Walker. 
Shaw accordingly consulted Utah Savings & Trust Abstract 
Company with respect to procuring a policy of title in-
surance. Bintz consented to the payment of the necessary 
costs and fees for the issuance of such title insurance in-
cluding the costs of quieting the title if necessary. Arrange-
ments were going forward on July 11, 1953, with Utah 
Savings & Trust Abstract Company to perfect the title and 
for the issuance of the title insurance policy but title had 
not been perfected or a policy of title insurance issued on 
that day. On or prior to July 11, 1953, Bintz prepared and 
signed a uniform real estate contract, dated July 11, 1953, 
for the sale and purchase of the premises embodying the 
terms of the Earnest Money Receipt. This form of contract 
was tendered to Walker for signature. Walker made no 
objection to the form of such proposed contract, but re-
fused to sign the same. On July 11, 1953, Walker repudiated 
the contract as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt on 
the alleged ground that Bintz had not furnished good and 
marketable title as required by the instrument and demand-
ed a return of his down payment (R. 103-109, Exhibits 1, 
3,7,8and9). 
The Earnest Money Receipt contains no provision that 
time is of the essence in the contract. 
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Bintz refused to return the down payment. The Earn-
est Money Receipt contains the following further provision: 
"In the event the purchaser fails to pay the 
balance of said purchase price or complete said pur-
chase as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon 
shall at the option of the Seller be retained as liqui-
dated and agreed damages." 
Walker brought suit against Bintz and Shaw for the 
recovery of the down payment and attorney's fees. Suit 
was brought in two counts. One for money had and re-
ceived, and the other for breach of contract in failing to 
furnish marketable title on July 11, 1953 (R. 1-4). 
Bintz counterclaimed alleging the making of the con-
tract as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt and that 
while the same was in force and effect and he was ready, 
able and willing to perform thereunder, Walker repudiated. 
Bintz alleged the provisions for retention of the down pay-
ment as liquidated damages and alleged in addition his 
actual damages for loss of his bargain and for injury to 
his property (R. 9-12). 
The trial court denied recovery on Walker's first count, 
held Walker entitled to recover against both Bintz and 
Shaw with interest from May 11, 1953, on the second count 
and denied recovery on the Bintz counterclaim (R. 147-153). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS A 
COMPLETE CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN NOT SO HOLDING. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARK-
ETABLE TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953. 
(a) The Earnest Money Receipt does not Require 
that Marketable Title be Furnished on July 
11, 1953. 
(b) If the Earnest Money Receipt Actually Re-
quired the Furnishing of Marketable Title on 
July 11, 1953, the Seller was Entitled to a 
Reasonable Time Thereafter to Perfect his 
Title. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTER-
CLAIM. 
(a) The Contract was in Force and Effect When 
the Purchaser Repudiated. 
(b) Bintz was Entitled to Enforce the Contractual 
Provisions for Liquidated Damages. 
(c) The A(!tual Damages of Bintz Exceed $1,-
000.00. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
SHAW. 
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POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
RECOVERY OF INTEREST FROM MAY 11, 
1953. 
ARGUMENT 
Much of the evidence in this case goes to the question 
of whether the abstract submitted by Bintz showed market-
able title in him. Counsel for Bintz passed the title. Coun-
sel for Walker opined that it was defective. Reasonable men 
might differ on the question. If the title were unmarketable 
the defects arose because of uncertain descriptions early 
in the chain of title. No one asserted any adverse claim to 
the premises and no one expressed any doubt that the title 
could be cured by an action to quiet title. 
We believe it unnecessary for the court on this appeal 
to determine whether the title as disclosed by the abstract 
was marketable. It may be assumed here that it was not. 
This case, it seems to us, is controlled by a determina-
tion of the question as to when Bintz was obligated to 
furnish marketable title. The question has two aspects. 
Was Bintz obligated to furnish marketable title prior to 
full performance by the purchaser? If Bintz was obligated 
to furnish marketable title on part performance by the 
purchaser on July 11, 1953, did Bintz have a reasonable 
time thereafter in which to cure title defects? 
Under the points relied on appellants will present their 
views on this problem. Points IV and V seem clearly to 
require a reversal of the judgment of the trial court, hoW· 
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ever, they do not bear directly upon the issue which we 
regard as of importance in this case. 
POINT I. 
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS A 
COMPLETE CONTRACT AND THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN NOT SO HOLDING. 
In the view of appellants, a proper disposition of this 
case requires at the outset a recognition of the nature of 
Earnest Money Receipts. These instruments in substantial-
ly the same form as the Earnest Money Receipt here in-
volved have been before this court for construction in 
several cases. 
In Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P. 2d 893, this 
court considered such an Earnest Money Receipt in an 
action for specific performance. There the appellant seek-
ing to avoid the instrument contended (1) that the parties 
did not intend the so called "preliminary agreement" to be 
a binding contract and (2) that such instrument was in-
complete and uncertain in various particulars so that 
specific performance could not be decreed without impos-
ing terms to which the parties had not agreed. 
The court fully considered the nature of the instru-
ment and held it to be a binding and enforceable contract 
complete in itself. 
In Olsen v. Tholen, 111 Utah 241, 177 P. 2d 75, this 
1 
court again had before it an Earnest Money Receipt and 
j sustained a decree of specific performance based thereon. 
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In Garff Realty Co. v. Better Buildings, Inc., __ Utah 
__ , 234 P. 2d 842, this court considered an Earnest Money 
Receipt in connection with an action by a broker for the 
recovery of a commission and held the instrument sufficient-
ly complete to sustain such an action. See also, Reich v. 
Christopulos, -- Utah ~-, 256 P. 2d 238. 
So in the case at bar, the instrument embodies a com-
plete contract for the sale and purchase of the premises 
involved because it sets forth all the essential terms of sale 
and purchase; namely, sale price, down payment, monthly 
installments, date of final payment, rate of interest on de-
ferred principal, character of title to be furnished, abstract 
or title insurance to be delivered, and the form of con-
veyance. What more is necessary to make out an enforce-
able contract, complete in itself? 
The fact that upon the payment of the $4,000.00 on 
July 11, 1953, the parties contemplated the making of a 
further contract is immaterial. This same problem was in-
volved in Johnson v. Jones, supra. The court in meeting 
this contention, at page 97 of the Utah Report, makes the 
following statement : 
"As to the claim that the instrument sued on 
refers to another contract to be executed, the form 
of which is indefinite, we need only mention that 
the terms and conditions specified in the prelimin· 
ary agreement are also specified in the uniform 
real estate contract form of which the buyers signed 
and which was submitted to the seller for his signa-
ture. He made no objection at the time of presenta· 
tion that it attempted to impose on him any condi-
tions to which he had not already assented. In fact 
he paid no attention to it. It might have been better 
if the preliminary agreement had specifically men-
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tioned the 'uniform real estate contract' so that the 
printed form would have been incorporated by 
reference, but in view of what we have said relative 
to the claimed uncertainty just dealt with, further 
discussion of this contention is unnecessary." 
No contention was made here that the proposed uni-
form real estate 'Contract did not embody the terms al-
ready agreed upon. Walker in the case at bar, like the seller 
in the Johnson case, simply paid no attention to the pro-
posed contract. The contention of Walker was that he was 
relieved of obligations under the Earnest Money Receipt and 
was entitled to repudiate it because, as he asserted, the 
seller had not delivered to him a marketable title on the 
11th day of July, 1953. 
Appellant will hereafter consider the question as to 
whether the seller was bound to deliver marketable title 
on July 11, 1953, and the rights and duties of the parties 
in connection with the furnishing of title, but it seems 
fundamental to us that the trial court could not properly 
determine the issues involved in this case without recogniz-
ing the outset that the Earnest Money Receipt embodied a 
complete enforceable contract. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING 
THAT THE SELLER MUST FURNISH MARK-
ETABLE TITLE ON JULY 11, 1953. 
(a) The Earnest Money Receipt does not Require 
that Marketable Title be Furnished on July 
11, 1953. 
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The trial court appears to have concluded that the 
seller was obligated to furnish marketable title on July 
11, 1953. In this there was error. 
The contract does not impose such a duty on the seller. 
The contract provisions bearing upon this obligation are as 
follows: 
"The seller agrees to furnish good and market-
able title with abstract to date or at seller's option 
a policy of title insurance in the name of the pur-
chaser and to make final conveyance by warranty 
deed." 
What is meant by the phrase "to date?" The trial 
court apparently concluded that the phrase meant the date 
of July 11, 1953. Such a conclusion, however, does not find 
support in the contract itself. Several dates appear upon 
the face of the instrument. The instrument is dated May 
11, 1953; Bintz accepted the proposal on May 12, 1953; on 
July 11, 1953 the additional $4,000.00 was to be paid; on 
August 11, 1953, the monthly payments were to commence; 
while on or before July 11, 1956, the purchase price was 
to be paid in full. Which of these dates if any, is identified 
in the phrase "to date?" By testing the question on the basis 
of reason and logic, it can readily be demonstrated that the 
date of July 11, 1953, is not the date referred to in the 
phrase. Assume that the title of the seller were marketable 
on the 11th day of July, 1953, but at the time of conveyance 
the title had for any reason become wholly unmarketable. 
Would the purchaser seriously contend that Bintz had 
performed his contract by furnishing a title, marketable 
some three years prior to date of conveyance, but worthless 
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upon delivery of deed? The merchantability of a seller's 
title is determined as of the time when the buyer is en-
titled to receive that title. This is not an arbitrary rule of 
property law, but is a rule based upon reason and the prac-
tical necessities of real estate transactions; its application 
enables a purchaser to protect himself by procuring the 
title bargained for at the time that title becomes vested 
in him by conveyance. 
In the recent case before this court of Woodard v. 
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 221, 265 P. 2d 398, the defendant in the 
purchase of land agreed to pay $500.00 down, $27,000.00 
in one month, and $4,000.00 or more each year for five 
years thereafter, and plaintiffs agreed to convey by war-
ranty deed upon payment being made. Defendant paid the 
down payment by a check which was later stopped, and 
plaintiff brought suit to enforce the contract and for re-
covery of the money then due under the same. Defendant 
attacked the marketability of the plaintiff's title. In hold-
ing that the time to test the marketability of the plaintiff's 
title was at the time of conveyance this court said: 
"Defendants attack on the marketability of 
plaintiff's title was premature, since, under the 
authorities, that fact is determinable, not as of the 
date of execution of the contract, but as of the time 
a vendee tenders that which, under the contract, 
would require the vendor to transfer not only 
marketable title, but the title which the latter agreed 
to convey." 
,~ The rule announced in Woodard v. Allen supra is in 
~ accordance with the general rule prevailing in this country. 
~ 
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See 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 153 and 
277. 
The case at bar seems clearly to fall within the general 
rule announced by this court in Woodard v. Allen supra. 
The phrase "to date" must mean the date of performance 
by seller. Accordingly, the attack by 'Valker upon the Bintz 
title in July, 1953, was premature and the repudiation by 
Walker was therefore unlawful. 
Nor is the situation altered by the fact that Bintz 
having a difficult and reluctant buyer on the contract, 
voluntarily undertook to do anything within reason in 
an effort to satisfy the demands of the purchaser. 
(b) If the Earnest Money Receipt Actually Re-
quired the Furnishing of Marketable Title on 
July 11, 1953, the Seller was Entitled to a 
Reasonable Time Thereafter to Perfect his 
Title. 
We earnestly believe that the contractual duty of the 
seller was to furnish marketable title upon conveyance of 
the property. Assuming, however, for the purpose of this 
presentation that the contract required the seller to exhibit 
good title on July 11, 1953, the seller would nevertheless 
be entitled to a reasonable time thereafter in which to per· 
fect his title. 
As we pointed out in the Statement of Facts, there is 
no provision in the Earnest Money Receipt that time was 
of the essence of the contract. The general rule of law in 
the United States is to the effect that in contracts for the 
sale of real estate, unless time is expressly made the essence 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
of the contract, the seller has a reasonable time after the 
purchase price is due in which to perfect his title. 
This rule is stated in 55 Am. Jur. Vendor and Pur-
chaser, Section 273, as follows: 
"Where time is not of the essence of the con-
tract, and is not made essential by an offer to fulfill 
by the purchaser, and a request for a conveyance, 
the vendor is entitled to a reasonable time and op-
portunity to secure or perfect his title. In these 
circumstances an arbitrary and sudden determina-
tion of the transaction cannot be permitted immedi-
ately to end pending disputes and negotiations as to 
title. The vendor must be allowed a reasonable 
length of time in which to perform. An arbitrary 
notice of termination may be entirely disregarded. 
What is a reasonable time in which to perfect de-
fects in the title depends upon the circumstances." 
The facts in Larkin v. Koether, 137 A. 849 (New 
Jersey) are particularly analagous to the case at bar. 
There suit was brought for specific performance of a con-
tract for the sale of lands. The contract contained a coven-
ant that the buildings upon the premises were all within 
the boundary lines of the property and that there were no 
encroachments. The fact was that a building on the land 
encroached upon a street at the time the contract was 
made. The defendant sought to avoid the effect of the 
contract by attempted recision at the time set for per-
formance. The court in denying this contention said in 
part: 
"It should be noted that immediately upon dis-
covery of the alleged encroachment and one day 
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before the date fixed for settlement, the defendant 
advised complainant that he would not accept title, 
demanding the return of his down money, and at-
tempting to rescind the contract of sale. No op-
portunity was given to complainant for the removal 
of the title objection, and the possibility of its re-
moval is indicated by the adoption of the ordinance 
above referred to. Obviously, this arbitrary action 
cannot be justified because time was not the essence 
of the contract and no definite date was thereafter 
fixed by either of the parties for closing." (Citing 
Pomeroy's Specific Performance, Section 396.) 
For a further discussion of this question and a collec-
tion of cases on the subject, see 57 A. L. R. Page 1519. 
The rule announced above is particularly applicable 
here. Even if we assume that Bintz was obligated to ex-
hibit marketable title on July 11, 1953, Walker was not 
then entitled to conveyance. In fact, three more years were 
allowed under the contract before the full purchase price 
was due. Bintz was ready and willing to take all steps 
necessary to perfect his title. He had ample time in which 
to do so, and there was no intimation in this case that the 
Bintz title could not be perfected by the action to quiet 
title. A clearer case could hardly be found for invoking 
the rule which prevents a purchaser from seizing upon an 
asserted unmarketability of title as a ground for charging 
a seller with breach of contract. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
RECOVERY ON THE BINTZ COUNTER-
CLAIM. 
(a) The Contract was in Force and Effect When 
the Purchaser Repudiated. 
On July 11, 1953, the contract of sale and purchase, 
as embodied in the Earnest Money Receipt, was in force 
and effect. This is true whether or not the contract re-
quired the furnishing of marketable title on that day, for 
as hereinabove shown, even though Bintz were required 
to furnish marketable title, on July 11, 1953, time not being 
of the essence, he had a reasonable time thereafter to do so. 
This being so, Walker had no right on that day to 
repudiate. He, however, did so and Bintz upon such repudi-
ation by Walker had the right either to disregard the re-
pudiation and proceed to compel performance or he could 
treat the contract as totally breached and at an end. The 
rule on this subject is stated in the Restatement of the Law 
of Contracts, 1948 Supplement, Section 318 as follows: 
"In the case (1) of a bilateral contract that has 
not become unilateral by full performance on one 
side, and (2) of a unilateral contract where the 
agreed exchange for the promise or for its per-
formance has not . been given, any of the following 
acts, done without justification by a promisor in a 
contract before he has committed a breach under 
the rules stated in sections 314-315, constitutes an 
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anticipatory repudiation which is a total breach of 
contract: 
"(a) a positive statement to the promisee 
or other person having a right under the con-
tract, indicating that the promisor will not or 
cannot substantially perform his contractual 
duties." 
The conduct of Walker on July 11, 1953, falls precisely 
within the rule of this restatement. For Walker through 
the letter and oral representations of his counsel on that 
date, stated positively that he would not perform the con-
tract, repudiated the same, and demanded the return of his 
down payment. 
It is elementary of course that a total breach of a con-
tract brings the contract to an end and gives the aggrieved 
party a right to the recovery of damages arising from the 
breach. This being the case, it is inescapable that Bintz 
had a cause of action against Walker for his total breach of 
the contract. The only remaining question is the extent of 
the damage that Bintz was entitled to recover. 
(b) Bintz was Entitled to Enforce the Contractual 
Provisions for Liquidated Damages. 
The contract as herein. shown provides among other 
things that in the event the purchaser fails to pay the 
balance of said purchase price or complete said purchase as 
herein provided, the amounts paid hereon shall at the op-
tion of the seller be retained as liquidated and agreed 
damages. 
Walker is a building contractor, ~ngaged in real estate 
operations, and familiar with real estate transactions and 
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dealings. The total purchase price was $30,250.00; the down 
payment of $1,000.00 was therefore less than 4% of this 
purchase price. No fraud, concealment or misrepresentation 
is alleged or suggested. There are no facts here upon which 
a court might properly find that the retention by Bintz 
of the down payment of $1,000.00 would be oppressive, un-
conscionable or exorbitant. This case does not fall within 
the rule announced by this court in Perkins v. Spencer,_ 
Utah_, 243 P. 2d 446. On the contrary, this case quite 
clearly involves a situation where the amount retained is 
proportionate to the damages actually sustained and comes 
within the rule of Bramwell v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P. 2d 
913; Dopp v. Richards, 43 Utah 332, 135 P. 98; Cooley v. 
Call, 61 Utah 203, 211 P. 977; Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 
313, 121 P. 2d 401, and other cases which have sustained 
provisions for liquidated damages. 
(c) The Actual Damages of Bintz Exceed $1,-
000.00. 
Manford Shaw of the appellant Shaw, Inc. testified 
with respect to the damages sustained by Bintz for the 
loss of bargain. His testimony shows that after Walker 
repudiated efforts were made to sell the property. It was 
offered at $27,500.00, but no buyer was secured. A con-
ditional offer of $25,000.00 was obtained. ·The condition 
1 was that a water main extension from Salt Lake City could 
1 be secured. Bintz accepted the conditional offer. Through 
1 no fault of his the water main could not be obtained, and 
the transaction fell through. No other or better offer could 
. be obtained (R. 109-111): 
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Manford Shaw further testified, without dispute, that 
because of the time element alone, wholly apart from the 
physical condition of the property itself, the loss of Bintz 
from the Walker repudiation was in excess of $1,000.00 
(R. 113). 
After the Walker repudiation and the inability of 
Bintz to sell the property in its entirety, Bintz concluded to 
subdivide the premises, construct the necessary improve-
ments and dispose of the property in lots. Counsel for re-
spondent sought to show that the realization of Bintz by 
this method of disposition would be greater than under 
the Walker sale. Although Bintz had not yet determined 
all of his costs in connection with the subdivision, his best 
judgment was that he would realize from the sale of lots 
from $2,000.00 to $2,500.00 less than under the Walker 
sale and in addition he would be under the necessity of 
selling the property piecemeal (R. 132-133). 
From this evidence it is clear that the actual damage 
of Bintz was in excess of $1,000.00. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RENDERING 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT 
SHAW. 
As herein shown Walker repudiated the contract at a 
time when the same was in force and effect and Bintz was 
entitled to recover and retain the liquidated damages of 
$1,000.00. The trial court appears to have failed to perceive 
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the nature of the relationship of the parties and the legal 
results flowing from their conduct and the actual issues 
involved in this case. The error of the court in this respect 
is demonstrated by permitting recovery against the appel-
lant Shaw. 
As herein shown, Walker proceeded on two counts. 
One, for money had and received, the other for damages for 
breach of contract. Recovery was denied under the first 
count and allowed under the second against both Bintz and 
Shaw. 
Shaw was not a party to the contract. It acted only as 
a broker. The agency of Shaw was shown on the face of the 
contract and known to the parties throughout the transac-
tion. The actual contract of sale and purchase was between 
Walker and Bintz alone. They signed the instrument as 
principals. 
Under these facts, it seems quite elementary that no 
judgment for damages arising from breach of contract 
could be had or recovered against Shaw. The rule is an-
nounced in Restatement of the Law of Agency, Section 328 
as follows: 
"An agent, by making a contract only on behalf 
of a competent, disclosed or partially disclosed prin-
cipal whom he has power so to bind, does not there-
by become liable for its non-performance." 
Most surely Shaw was not liable for any breach of 
the contract here involved and the court erred in allowing 
judgment against it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
POINT V. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
RECOVERY OF INTEREST FROM MAY 11, 
1953. 
No recovery of the principal sum of $1,000.00 should 
have been allowed in this case for the reasons herein shown. 
The apparent inability of the trial court to perceive the 
nature of the case and the issues actually involved is further 
demonstrated in its treatment of interest. 
Under no theory could it be contended that the reten-
tion of the $1,000.00 down payment by Bintz was wrongful 
prior to the demand of July 11, 1953. Until the retention be-
came wrongful, interest was not allowable. This rule has 
received universal recognition. It is stated in 30 Am. 
Jur. Interest, Section 46 as follows: 
"Where a person wrongfully detains money, no 
demand is necessary to charge him with interest, 
but where there is no wrong in acquiring or detain-
ing the money, a demand is necessary to charge the 
party with interest, and its computation will begin 
on such demand." (Citing numerous cases.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Bintz and Walker entered into a contract for the sale 
1d purchase of real estate. This contract was in force 
1d effect on July 11, 1953, regardless of whether Bintz 
as obligated on that day to furnish marketable title, for 
ren though he was .t so obligated he had a reasonable 
me to perfect title. While the contract was thus in force 
1d effect, Walker repudiated thereby committing a total 
reach of the contract. This repudiation precluded Walker 
~om claiming breach of contract and entitled Bintz to sue 
>r damages sustained. The liquidated damages provision 
f the contract is reasonable and enforceable in this case; 
1 any event, the actual damages of Bintz exceed the liquid-
ted amount provided for in the contract. While the fore-
oing propositions dispose of the essential issues in this 
ase, the error of the trial court in failing to perceive these 
1sues is further demonstrated in permitting recovery 
gainst the appellant Shaw and in allowing interest from 
date prior to demand for return of the $1,000.00. 
The case should be reversed and remanded with direc-
lon to enter judgment in favor of Bintz on his counterclaim 
ermitting and allowing him to retain the $1,000.00 as 
amages for Walker's breach of contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. N. CORNWALL, 
VANCOTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
Attorneys for Appellants, 
C. C. Bintz and Shaw, Inc. 
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